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In most urban cities across Australia, water restrictions remain the dominant policy 
mechanism to restrict urban water consumption.  The extensive adoption of water 
restrictions over several years means that Australian urban water prices have consistently 
not reflected the opportunity cost of water (Edwards 2008).  Given the generally strong 
political support for water restrictions and the likelihood that they will persist for some 
time, there is value in understanding householders’ attitudes in this context.  More 
specifically, identifying the welfare gains associated with avoiding urban water 
restrictions entirely would be a non-trivial contribution to our knowledge. This paper is 
used to describe the results from a contingent valuation study that investigates 
consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid urban water restrictions.  Importantly, the 
research also investigates the influence of cognitive and exogenous dimensions on the 
utility gain associated with avoiding water restrictions.  The results provides some 
salutary insights into the impact of this policy mechanism on economic welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
In most urban cities across Australia, the level of rainfall is the key variable that 
determines the extent to which water can be harvested and used by the urban population.  
Faced with a sequence of dry years water restrictions remain the dominant policy 
mechanism to restrict urban water consumption.  Economists are generally of the view 
that this type of allocation mechanism does not achieve economic efficiency.  Using 
water efficiently in an urban context requires that it be allocated to those users who gain 
the highest marginal social value (see, for example, Edwards 2008).  This is often not 
given priority in an urban water economy, with social and political objectives generally 
dominating decision making.  
 
Water restrictions usually constrain particular uses of water, but they do not require 
households to reduce the amount of water they use per se.  Therefore, water restrictions 
do not directly address the fundamental issue of ‘total use of water’ and furthermore 
restrict householders’ freedoms regarding water use.  Understandably, there is substantial 
conjecture about the positive and negative consequences of restrictions in the eyes of 
consumers.   
 
Politicians favouring water restrictions commonly try to gain the support of the public by 
playing the ‘moral suasion’ card.  Appeals are also often made on the basis of 
‘intergenerational equity’, i.e. use less water to ensure water for your children (ABC 
News 2008; Our Water, Our Future 2009).  It has also become common place for   4
proponents of restrictions to claim that the public generally supports water restrictions 
and the punitive measures that attend them.  
 
A useful contribution may be to challenge the context of these claims.  For instance, is 
the purported support of the public premised on the assumption that the populous is 
attentive and knowledgeable about the national distribution of water and able to avail 
themselves of important information? Often, consumers are ignorant toward options and 
opportunities and this is apparent not only among the poor or the uneducated (Shafir 
2007).   Arguably, there is ample evidence in the press and elsewhere that consumer 
knowledge of water is far from complete (see, for instance, Crase 2009) and it may be 
useful to test the purported public support for water restrictions against this factor. 
 
In the current context, understanding the value that consumers place on avoiding water 
restrictions would offer some insight into the welfare costs that are inflicted by water 
restrictions.  Moreover, investigating the influence that psychometric and exogenous 
variables have on the value estimates of avoiding water restrictions would be a useful 
contribution in terms of differentiating the urban water customer market. 
 
This paper considers the welfare estimates associated with avoiding water restrictions by 
presenting the results of a contingent valuation (CV) study drawing data from NSW and 
Victoria.  The research also embodies data from water rich and water poor communities 
and draws from regional and metropolitan settings.  Accordingly, the influence of these 
variables over the preferences of consumers can be considered.   5
 
The paper itself is divided into three additional parts. Section two explores several 
aspects of choice behaviour covering economic, sociological and psychological 
dimensions.  In section three, we briefly consider the theoretical groundings of CV and 
present the design and results of this study.  More specifically, we report the empirical 
estimates of respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid urban water restrictions. The 
final section addresses the core findings before offering some brief concluding remarks. 
 
2. Behaviourist perspective 
Behavioural economics builds on the foundations established by neo-classical economics 
by incorporating a focus on the underlying psychological cognitions and, in turn, improve 
predictions of field phenomena and policy. It is important to note that this approach does 
not dismiss conventional economics where equilibrium, efficiency, and utility 
maximisation are central.  Rather, behavioural economics develops traditional economics 
in that it offers a greater psychological dimension and often simply relaxes basic 
assumptions that are not key to the economic field (Camerer et al. 2004).  It also offers 
useful insights into choice and decision behaviour generally. 
 
Stern (2000) has developed an outline of variables that influence behaviour comprising 
four main groups
1.  These include attitudinal factors, external or contextual forces, 
personal capabilities, and habit or routines.  Attitudinal factors include values, norms, 
beliefs, and attitudes.  These particular variables may affect the general behaviour of 
                                                 
1 Stern (2000) developed these groups after reviewing existing literature that studied causal variables on 
behaviour in an environmental context.   6
individuals or their specific behaviours.  There are a number of theories that underpin 
behavioural variance.  Namely, the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger (1957), the 
norm-activation theory of Schwartz (1977), the new environmental paradigm (NEP) scale 
of Dunlop and Van Liere (1978), and the theory of planned behaviour
2.   
 
Secondly, the external or contextual forces are variables that are exogenous to individuals 
and these may drive choices.  For instance, financial constraints, legal structures, 
regulations, a constrained physical environment, and community expectations are all 
influencing factors that are exogenous to the individual.  Notably, the way in which these 
factors impact on an individual’s behaviour is dependent on their beliefs and attitudes 
(Stern 2000). In the present context,  the way water restrictions impact on an individual’s 
behaviour will be dependent at least in part on their beliefs and attitudes. 
 
Thirdly, personal capabilities refer to the knowledge and skills that are required for 
certain behaviours.  A number of authors suggest that the explanatory power of socio-
demographic variables is relatively limited in the context of environmental behaviours 
(see, for instance, Bateman et al. 2002; Dietz et al. 1998; McFarlane and Boxall 2003).  
However, Stern (2000) claims that variables such as income, gender, age and educational 
level may be proxies for personal capacities.   
 
Finally, habits or routines also provide a set of variables that influence behaviour.  Stern 
(2000) acknowledge that habits and routines may need to be altered in order for 
                                                 
2 Armitage and Conner (2001) regard the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) of Ajzen (1991) and the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as the most widely researched model of the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour.   7
behaviour to change.  However, this particular set of variables does not require 
substantial analysis in the current context as the focus of this study centres on rational, 
conscious choice behaviour. 
 
According to Stern (2000), these causal factors are not independent of each other, and 
behaviours are dependent on a wide range of causal factors, both general and behaviour-
specific.  In addition, the literature suggests that attitudinal factors appear to demonstrate 
the greatest predictive power when behaviours are not extensively limited by context or 
personal capacities (see, for instance, Stern 2000; Tyler et al. 1982; Ajzen 1991; 
Bamberg 2003).   
 
2.1 A closer look at the psychology of choice behaviour: The theory of 
planned behaviour 
The theory of planned behaviour is a model developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) to 
predict an individual’s behaviour.  This model is embedded in a framework of learning 
theories and builds on the theory of propositional control (Dunlany 1967) and the theory 
of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1970).  The theory of planned behaviour has 
proved effective in predicting behavioural intention and actual behaviour in a wide range 
of situations, including donating blood, safer sex behaviours, alcohol use and voting 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Bryan, Ruiz and O’Neill 2003; Sheppard, Hartwick and 
Warshaw 1988).  The theory suggests that the intention to engage in a particular 
behaviour is a function of three antecedents: the attitude toward the behaviour, social   8
norms, and perceived behavioural control.  The following discusses these in more detail 
and in the context of the research problem. 
 
2.1.1 Attitudes 
D’Astous et al. (2005, p.292) defines attitudes as “an evaluative predisposition toward 
the behaviour as a function of its determinant personal consequences”.  That is, the 
individual’s attitude toward a particular behaviour is operationalised by the beliefs about 
the negative consequences and rewards associated with performing that behaviour (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 1970; Harrell 1991; Tolman, Edleson and Fendrich 1996).  The anticipated 
gain and loss related with a certain behaviour is measured against one another to aid in 
choosing the behaviour that minimises loss and maximises gain.   
 
The conclusions drawn from existing research into attitudes vary.  For instance, Aitken et 
al. (1994) suggests that attitudes have limited explanatory power regarding water 
consumption behaviour, although this result must be reviewed in relation to 
methodological concerns (see, for instance, Watson et al. 1999).  Moore et al. (1994) 
studied changes in community water conservation attitudes, knowledge, and behaviour 
intentions and found significant correlation between reported behaviour attitudes, and 
intentions.   
 
2.1.2 Social norms 
Subjective norms are defined as “the perceived social acceptability of behaviour” 
(Kernsmith 2005).  Norms are usually limited to the social acceptability of the behaviour   9
to people that are most significant to the individuals, however they may also include 
expectations by the society in general.  Social norms related to the acceptability of 
domestic water usage have been addressed in primary prevention campaigns involving 
television and radio commercials, billboards, and education efforts in schools that attempt 
to convey the message that excessive water use is unacceptable (DSE 2004). In the 
context of water usage, social norms are evolving.  Put simply, it is becoming 
increasingly socially unacceptable for consumers not to take responsibility for their own 
water consumption, especially in the urban domain.  
 
2.1.3 Perceived behavioural control 
Perceived behavioural control is an individual’s perception of the extent to which they 
have the capacity (i.e. resources and opportunities) to achieve a behaviour in a successful 
way (d’Astous et al. 2005).  These expectations vary in their magnitude, generality and 
strength.  Basically, the theory proposes that an individual’s confidence in their ability 
differs across situations, with magnitude referring to the degree of difficulty to perform 
the behaviour, generality to the scope of situations that the behaviour may be necessary 
and strength refers to the individual’s degree of confidence (Kernsmith 2005).  In the 
current context, the perception that individuals have of their behavioural control 
regarding compliance with water restrictions may potentially impact on their preferences 
toward avoiding them. Such preferences may manifest in a WTP (discussed later). 
 
This discussion suggests that there is scope to address wider politico-economic 
considerations associated with urban water restrictions.  More specifically, it is plausible   10
to identify individuals’ WTP to avoid restrictions and investigate how this interacts with 
psychological and exogenous variables and information about water management 
generally. 
 
3. Contingent valuation 
To further investigate householders’ preferences surrounding water restrictions, data were 
collected to specifically uncover the preference for avoiding restrictions entirely.  These 
data are considered in the context of the CV methodology. 
 
3.1 Bid  design 
Amongst the stated preference techniques, the most extensively used approach is the 
contingent valuation (CV) method, which has been commonly employed to value 
preferences for goods across numerous countries (Carson et al. 1995; Carson 2001).  In a 
CV method study, respondents are asked questions to elicit their maximum WTP or 
minimum willingness to accept compensation for a predetermined change.  A number of 
contingent valuation studies have used the multiple-bounded discrete choice (MBDC) 
response format as an alternative to the dichotomous choice format (Loomis and Ekstrand 
1997; Welsh and Poe 1998; Poe et al. 2001; Cameron et al. 2002; Roach et al. 2002; 
Alberini  et al. 2003; Evans et al. 2003; Vossler et al. 2003). The MBDC approach 
increases the number of possible intervals to k+1 (where k is the number of bids shown to 
a respondent)
3.  This approach improves the efficiency of the welfare estimate (Rowe et 
al. 1996).   
                                                 
3 The MBDC approach presents respondents with a range of bid amounts, which are spaced by intervals.   11
 
This research employed a payment card (MBDC) with an exponential response scale 
design that contained 13 cells.  The value given to respondents in the first cell was $0.  
The values in the second cell through to cell twelve were computed by equation (1), 
 
Bn = B1 (1 + k) 
n-1     (1) 
 
In this case, Bn is the bid amount, where B1 equals 1 and k is determined by the range 
selected for the payment card.  The value of k is selected so that (1+k)
11 equals the largest 
value on the payment card i.e. (1.86)
11= 921
4.    Appendix A illustrates the bid design 
used for this study.  The bids range from $0 to $900 and have a k value of 0.86.  For ease 
of respondent review, the actual values listed on the payment card were rounded.   
Expressing a value of $900 instead of $921, or $40 instead of $41, is less distracting to 
respondents when they review the payment card, rarely has this had a significant effect 
on WTP summary statistics, and is not likely to be within the reporting precision of 
respondents (Rowe et al. 1996).  In this study, the MBDC format required respondents to 
indicate their voting certainty on a proposed policy referendum at each of the possible 
dollar values specified on the payment card (bids) by choosing from “definitely no”, 
“probably no”, “not sure”, “probably yes”, and “definitely yes” response alternatives.  
The exact question asked was: 
 
“Given your household’s income and other expenses, we would like you to think about 
whether or not you would be willing to make an annual payment so your household 
would not be subject to water restrictions.  This amount would be listed as a separate item 
                                                 
4 The value k equals the percent increase between adjacent cells before smoothing of the values.  Cell 13 
includes the text ‘More than the above,’ which implies more than B12.     12
on one of your water bills for the year. For each of the amounts below, please indicate 
your willingness to pay to avoid water restrictions” (refer to Appendix A). 
 
3.2 Data collection 
Six cities were selected to draw the sample for conducting the main survey, which was 
distributed on-line to a random sample of households
5.  These cities provided scope for 
analysis on several dimensions, including comparisons between water rich and water 
poor cities; Victorian and NSW cities; and regional and metropolitan cities.  Complete 
and valid information was gathered from 512 respondents (Wodonga: 54; Albury: 94; 
Melbourne: 106; Sydney:102; Goulburn: 51; Bendigo:105). Notably, the surveys were 
framed such that half included information outlining the percentage of national water 
usage per sector and the remaining did not
6.  Table 1 presents some relevant 
characteristics of the pre-defined study locations. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Refer to Fleming and Cook (2007) for a review of the advantages and disadvantages of on-line surveys. 
6 The significance of this is investigated later in the paper by including the variable FACTS into the 
models.   13
Table 1. Characteristics of study locations 
 
City State  Rural  or 
Metropolitan 
Centre 
Population Average  annual 
residential water supplied 
for the period 2006-2008 
(kL/property)À 
Melbourne Victoria    Metropolitan  3.9 million†  161 
Wodonga Victoria Rural  34  504
*  235.5 
Bendigo Victoria  Rural  96  741
*  158.5 
Goulburn NSW  Rural  27  277
*  146.5 
Albury NSW Rural  48  629
*  234.5 
Sydney NSW  Metropolitan  4.4 million†  190.5 
†Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009 
*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008 
À This indicator is derived from dividing the total volume of residential water supplied with the 
number of connected residential water properties (Source: National Water Commission National 
Performance Report 2007-2008) 
 
 
Sampling was completed during April 2008, with a response rate of 59%.  The 
characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Sociodemographics of the Survey Respondents 
Metropolitan (Sydney, Melbourne)  40% 
Rural or Regional Centres (Albury, Wodonga, Goulburn, Bendigo)  60% 
New South Wales  48% 
Victoria 52% 
Average age  42 yrs 
Average household income before tax  $978 per week 




The questionnaire consisted of four parts.  The first part contained questions regarding 
respondents’ attitude toward water restrictions.  A choice-experiment was also presented   14
to respondents in the second section and questions regarding the respondents’ socio-
economic status were presented in part three
7.  The final section was used to probe 
respondents about their WTP to avoid water restrictions. The focus of the remainder of 
this paper will be on the results and findings of the respondents’ WTP to avoid water 
restrictions.  However, a feature of the data should be noted here:  18% of the sample 
reported that they would “definitely not” be prepared to pay any monetary amount to 
avoid restrictions i.e. this group gave the same response irrespective of the bid amount.  
This implies a form of protest, or at least a perception that restrictions are not welfare 
reducing per see.  As such their presence requires an extension to the normal statistical 
models used to analyze such data.   
 
3.3 Ordered probit model 
There are a number of techniques for retrieving WTP estimates from this form of data. 
Here we applied an ordered probit model (see, for instance, Cameron et al. 2002; Horna 
et al. 2007).  The central concept of an ordered probit model is that there is a latent 
continuous metric underlying the ordinal responses observed by the analyst.  Thresholds 
partition the real line into a series of regions corresponding to the various ordinal 
categories.  The latent continuous variable, y *is a linear combination of some predictors, 
x, the bid amount plus a disturbance term that has a standard Normal distribution: 
 
y*i = xi β + β0Bid + ei,       ei ~N(0, 1),i = 1, . . . , N. 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Cooper and Crase (forthcoming) for a review of the choice-experiment analysis conducted with this 
data.   15
 yi, the observed ordinal variable for individual i, takes on integer values 0 through m 
according to the method below: 
 
 
yi = j      µj-1 < y*i ≤ µj, 
 
 
where j =0,…,m, and µ-1 = -∞, and µm = +∞, and the µj are defined as the ‘cut values’. 
 
To determine how changes in the predictors translate into the probability of observing a 
particular ordinal outcome consider the following:  
 
P[yi = 0] = P[µ-1 < y*i ≤ µ0], 
   = P[∞1 < y*i ≤ µ0], 
   = P[y*i ≤ µ 0], 
substituting from (1), 
   = P[xi β+ β0Bid+ ei ≤ µ 0],  
   = P[ei ≤ µ 0 - xi β- β0Bid], 
   = Ф(µ 0 - xi β- β0Bid); 
P[yi = 1] = P[µ 0 < y*i ≤ µ 1], 
  = P[µ 0 < xi β + β0Bid + ei ≤ µ 1], 
  = P[µ 0 - xi β - β0Bid < ei ≤ µ 1 - xi β- β0Bid], 





P[yi = j] = Ф (µ j - xi β- β0Bid) - Ф (µ j-1 - xi β - β0Bid ). 
 
 
For j = m (the ‘highest’ category) the generic form reduces to: 
 
P[yi = m] = Ф (µ m - xi β- β0Bid ) - Ф (µ m-1 - xi β -β0Bid ), 
      = 1 - Ф (µ m-1 - xi β - β0Bid). 
   16
 
A maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the model, thus initially a 
log-likelihood function is generated.  This is achieved by defining an indicator variable 
Zij , which equals 1 if yi = j and 0 otherwise.  The log-likelihood is simply: 
 







Zij ln[Ф ij - Ф i,j-1],   
 
 
where Ф ij = Ф [µ j - xi β- β0Bid] and Ф i,j-1 = Ф [µ j-1 - xi β -β0Bid]. 
       (Greene  1990) 
 
In the context of the current study, a number of further adjustments were made to account 
for the panel nature of the data (each respondent contributes 12 observations associated 
with the 12 bid amounts) and to allow for the possibility that the sample comprises a 
mixture, with different response behaviors.  This can be dealt with by estimating a 
random effects ordered probit model, where the error term is modified such that:  
 
y*ki = xi β + β0Bidk + ζi + eki,         eki ~N(0, σs
2) , ζi ~p1N(μ1, σc1
2)+ (1-p1)N(μ2, 1) 
 
where ζi is an individual specific random effect, and k indicates the bid within the panel.  
The implication is that the responses are correlated for an individual, but are independent 
across individuals (Alberini et al. 2003).  The individual specific effect ζi is specified as a 
mixture of two normals, with mixing probabilities of p1 and (1-p1).  The benefit of this 
specification is that it very parsimoniously allows for a latent class representation of 
complete rejection of the tradeoffs implied in the utility function. It is possible that some 
individuals are philosophically opposed to removing water restrictions, even if there were 
no cost to themselves. In fact, some 20% of the sample always select the “definitely no” 
response.    If the mean of one of the distributions takes on a large negative value, then,   17
conditional upon membership of that class, the probability of rejecting any bid size can 
approach 1.  Given that one cannot identify ex ante membership of the classes, the 
mixing probabilities identify the proportion of the sample.  However, it is possible to 
parameterize membership based on observed characteristics, which we apply here: 
probability of class membership is modeled as a logit functional form.  Identification 
requires that a number of restrictions be applied.  It is not possible for the mean of both 
normal distributions to be freely estimated: here we impose the restriction that the 
expected value of the means is zero (i.e p1μ1+ (1-p1)μ2 =0).   Similarly, one variance term 
has to be constrained (to unity) while the other is freely estimated (σc1
2). 
 
Finally, we allow for heterogeneity in the variance of the non-individual specific random 
component eki.  An issue with the standard specification of the ordered logit model is that 
it imposes a common variance across individuals.  The implication is that, for a common 
value of  deterministic utility, all respondents are assumed to have the same distribution 
of probabilities across the 5 classes of responses.  This does not allow for the possibility 
that some individuals may exhibit much greater consistency in their responses i.e. that the 
unobserved random component within each question may have a smaller variance for 
some than others.  The scaled ordered probit relaxes this assumption and parameterizes 
the variance σs
2.  These extensions to the representation of the error process gives 
considerable flexibility in the representation of different behaviors and motivations.  
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3.4 Findings 
A scaled ordered probit model was estimated for all respondents.  Table 3 summarizes 
the results of model 1, where significant socioeconomic and attitude items have been 
included in an attempt to improve model fit
8.   
                                                 
8 Refer to Appendix B for a description of the interaction variables.   19
Table 3. Ordered Probit Model 
 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level. * at 10% level. 
 
 Coefficient  Z  statistic 
BID -0.435  ***  29.33 
LAWN 0.237  ***  4.27 
WATER 0.093**  2.03 
FAIR 0.060  ***  2.66 
SPACT 0.046**  2.55 
TEDU 0.121  **  2.46 
NUMRES 0.071  **  2.36 
INCOME 0.374  ***  7.71 
VALUES 0.137  ***  3.45 
INTENTION 0.162  ***  3.34 
ATITUDE -0.281  ***  4.36 
OFTCOM -0.075  ***  2.54 
    
Cut points 
µ1  -0.412 ***  2.55 
µ2  0.046   0.29 
µ3  0.528 ***  3.26 
µ4  1.174 ***  7.17 
Scale equation (log standard deviation) 
EXTINFO 0.038***  3.34 
FACTS 0.116***  3.56 
Log odds parameters (class 1) 
EXTINFO 0.209**  2.41 
PBC 0.531***  3.54 
SOCIAL NORMS  -0.263*  1.89 
FAIR -0.209*  1.77 
constant -1.191***  7.83 
Random effects 
 Class  1  Class  2 
location -2.14  0.65 
Prior probability  0.23  0.77 
Log Likelihood  -5950.1452   20
 
The model indicates that a number of household characteristics are significant 
determinants of WTP: having a lawn, being in a water poor city, having tertiary 
education, higher number of residents in the house and higher income all lead to greater 
WTP.  Those who believe that the state has the right to impose restrictions, and that only 
allowing certain watering activities is reasonable, are also showing higher WTP. The 
model also indicates that a number of cognitive variables are significant determinants of 
WTP: those who expressed having a higher intention to comply with water restrictions 
and having higher environmental values were more WTP. Alternatively, respondents who 
showed a positive attitude toward water restrictions and who self report that they more 
often comply with regulations were less likely to pay to avoid them.  The 
parameterization of the variance shows two significant effects:  being presented with 
additional information on national water consumption trends in the survey, and being 
informed about water restrictions both tended to increase the variance of the error process 
i.e. increased understanding reduces the predictability of the individual’s response to any 
specific question. 
 
The introduction of the mixture model for the individual specific random effects gives 
two mass points, with means at -2.13 and 0.64, with prior probabilities of 0.23 and 0.73 
respectively (with an expected mean across the two of zero).   The first mass point is 
sufficiently negative where the probability of giving a “definitely no” response to even a 
zero bid amount is very high. The membership of this class is interpreted as essentially 
that group that does not show any response to the bids, consistent with a protest against 
the proposal to avoid water restrictions through a simple monetary payment.  The logit   21
model for membership reveals that those who believed themselves to be well informed 
about water restrictions, and those who held a higher perceived behavioural control over 
water were more likely to be members of this class who outright rejected the possibility 
of avoiding water restrictions, as were those who believed that water authorities did not 
have a right  to impose restrictions (possibly as a protest: if the restrictions are 
illegitimate, why should I have to pay to avoid them). Respondents that had a lesser 
concern for behaving ‘appropriately’ according to social norms were also more likely to 
be members of the class that rejected the possibility of avoiding water restrictions.  
 
The posterior probability of membership of each class is very tightly defined: over 96% 
of individuals are assigned to one or other classes with a probability greater than 99%.  
 
3.5   WTP to avoid water restrictions  
The definition of the median WTP is complicated if the central category is unsure.  In 
such cases one can only say that the median WTP lies within a bound.  These are defined 
in this case as:  
 




WTPu =  (xi β- μ2 )/β0 
 
where l and u indicate lower and upper bounds respectively.  Given the inclusion of the 
respondent-specific exogenous variables xj, the WTP values can be evaluated either at the 
means, or at specific values.  One view of these bounds is that they represent alternative 
interpretations of the value needed to achieve a majority in a referendum: the lower   22
assumes that the majority can include only those who say “definitely yes” and “probably 
yes”, while the upper bound considers those who respond both “yes” and “uncertain”.   
 
The median WTP for all respondents (assuming that the expected value of the individual 
specific random effect is zero), and for those in Class 2 are reported in Table 4 below.  As 
one might expect, the range across all individuals is high, with the lower level not 
significantly different from zero.  This is because this sample includes those who have an 
objection to accepting the policy, even at zero bid value.  Those in Class 2 is that group 
who are responsive to payments, and these give significant upper and lower bounds on 
median WTP.  
 
Table 4. Median WTP per annum  
  All Respondents   Class 2 
Lower bound (Conservative)  -$8  $141*** 
Upper bound (Liberal)  $103***  $252*** 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
 
Graphs 1 and 2 below illustrates the predicted probabilities for each outcome (definitely 
no; probably no; unsure; probably yes; definitely yes) for each of the bid amounts, 
conditional upon being in Class1 and Class2 respectively. 
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A number of unconditional median WTP values were estimated along situational 
dimensions in order to make meaningful comparisons within the sample data. Table 4 
below presents the range for the unconditional Median WTP across three dimensions for 
class 2 (those who are responsive to payment). As you would expect, the mediums 
remain negative for class 1 regardless of particular situational variables, thus these are not 
discussed further. 
 
Firstly, the WTP range is presented for respondents who have a lawn compared to those 
respondents who did not have a lawn. In class 2, respondents who have a lawn are 
generally more WTP to avoid water restrictions than those without a lawn. Even from the 
conservative perspective, respondents with a lawn were WTP $152 compared to those 
without who were WTP $98. 
 
Secondly, Table 4 enables us to compare the WTP range for water rich cities with water 
poor cities; i.e. those cities that have a history of severe water restrictions compared to 
those that have been faced with less severe restrictions or restrictions more recently. 
Analysis shows that respondents from water rich cities have a generally lower WTP 
range. This may, in part, be explained by the temporal dimension associated with water 
restrictions. For instance, those in water rich cities may not have been faced with the 
burdens associated with water restrictions long enough to be prompted to buy their way 
out of them. Alternatively, those in water poor cities are more likely to be experiencing a 
diminishing enthusiasm for water restrictions due to the extensive length of time they 
have been inflicted upon them.   25
 
Finally, the WTP range is presented for those respondents with ‘lower’ household income 
compared to those with a ‘higher’ income. The data reveals that those with a higher 
income had a higher WTP to avoid water restrictions. Notably, participants with a higher 
income indicate a WTP value of $181 from the conservative perspective, with the upper 
bound estimating a WTP value of $291.   
 
 
Table 4. Unconditional Median WTP Ranges: Class 2 
  Lawn 
 Yes  t-ratio  No  t-ratio 
Lower bound  $152.00  7.94*** $98.00 4.52*** 
Upper bound  $263.00  13.51*** $208.00  9.55*** 
       
  Water 
  Water Rich  t-ratio  Water Poor  t-ratio 
Lower bound  $158.00  7.84*** $137.00 7.07*** 
Upper bound  $269.00  13.13*** $247.00 12.60*** 
      
  Income 
 Low  t-ratio  High  t-ratio 
Lower bound  $106.00  5.38*** $181.00 9.24*** 
Upper bound  $216.00  10.90*** $291.00 14.60*** 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
Note: All other exogenous variables held constant at mean levels. 
 
   26
 
4.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
People’s sensitivity to water restrictions across a number of dimensions appears to differ 
between groups within the population.  Being able to identify the segments within the 
population who are most enthusiastic about paying to avoid water restrictions is an 
important element to developing effective policy. 
 
Contrary to the implied value of ‘saving water’ that dominates popular thinking, 
discussion reveals that particular segments within society actually value not being subject 
to water restrictions.  More specifically, attitudinal variables (e.g. attitudes toward water 
restrictions) and particular value sets (e.g. environmental values) were proven to play 
some part in influencing an individual’s WTP to avoid water restrictions.  Similarly, 
respondents that differ across socio-demographic variables such as income and education 
also appear to receive significantly differing levels of utility from avoiding water 
restrictions.  In addition, exogenous factors such as the severity and duration of water 
restrictions imposed within a respondent’s city and whether the respondent had a lawn or 
not were shown to have an influence on the respondent’s WTP to avoid water 
restrictions.  Interestingly, the development of the two classes implies that there is a 
group of respondents who do not prima facie gain utility from avoiding water restrictions 
and another where the impact of water restrictions on human welfare is self evident.   
 
The results also show that when respondents received additional information on their 
survey regarding national water allocation by sector it significantly reduced the 
predictability of their responses. Thus, further investigation into the influence of   27
educating householders about national water consumption trends on decision making 
appears to be warranted. Put differently, the data support the view that objective, factual 
data on water consumption significantly disturbs the choices in this context, at least 
relative to those who are exposed to the present information on water saving that typifies 
most jurisdictions. 
 
The policy implications of these findings are useful in terms of effectively differentiating 
the market according to variables that influence WTP for water. For instance, 
differentiating the price of discretionary water use for householders that have a lawn and 
a higher income compared to householders that do not have a lawn and a lower income 
appears to have merit. Moreover, presently, state jurisdictions impose a range of 
constraints to limit household water use with little account for individual preferences or 
use.  Clearly, this approach is not unanimously supported by the population, although 
many would appear to be in favour of more rigorous application across the populous 
simply for the sake of it (see Cooper and Crase forthcoming).  By way of contrast, the 
CV data show that particular household segments have a greater inclination to pay to 
avoid restrictions.  All of these topics are worthy of greater scrutiny in a policy context 
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Appendix A: Bid Design 
 
 
Given your household’s income and other expenses, we would like you to think about 
whether or not you would be willing to make an annual payment so your household 
would not be subject to water restrictions.  This amount would be listed as a separate item 
on one of your water bills for the year. 
 
For each of the amounts below, please indicate your willingness to pay to avoid 
water restrictions.    
  Willingness to Pay? 




0 A  B  C  D  E 
$2 A  B  C  D  E 
$3 A  B  C  D  E 
$6 A  B  C  D  E 
$12 A  B  C  D  E 
$20 A  B  C  D  E 
$40 A  B  C  D  E 
$80 A  B  C  D  E 
$150 A  B  C  D  E 
$250 A  B  C  D  E 
$500 A  B  C  D  E 
$900 A  B  C  D  E 
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VARIABLES  DESCRIPTOR  LEVELS/CODING 
AGE  4 stage scale 
18 to 24=1 
25 to 54=2 
55 to 64=3 
65+ =4 
WATER  Do respondents live in a 




Did respondents receive facts 
outlining national water usage 
on their survey 
Yes=1 
No=0 
















EDUCATION  Highest level of education 
completed 
Year 10 at secondary college=1 
Year 12 at secondary college=2 




The number of children in 
their household 
None=0 
1 or 2=1 
3 or 4=2 
5+ =3 
POOL  Do respondents have a pool 
Yes=1 









Intention to comply with 
water restrictions: where 
increased intention implies 
greater intention to comply 
with water restrictions. 
“I intend to follow 
water restrictions in 
the future” 
Factor Score: 4 intention 
questions (5 stage Likert 




Attitude toward water 
restrictions: where an 
increase in this variable 
implies a more favourable 
attitude toward complying 
with water restrictions. 
“I think it is a good 




toward social norms: where 
increased social norms 
implies a greater concern 
for behaving ‘appropriately’ 
according to society‘s 
norms. 
“Most members of 
my family think I 
should comply with 
water restrictions” x 
“Generally speaking, 
I want to do what 
most members of my 
family think I should 
do” 
Factor score: 11 Attitude 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to 2 
variables- ATTITUDE and 
SOCIAL NORMS 






implies stronger values for 
the environment. 






Compliance Values in 
general: where increased 
compliance values implies 
stronger values for 
complying with the law in 
general. 
“Generally, I feel that 
I have a duty to 
comply with the law” 
Factor score: 8 Attitude 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to 2 





control over the national 
water situation: where 
higher PBC implies higher 
perceived control. 
“It won’t make any 
difference if my 
household does not 
comply with water 
restrictions” 
Factor Score: 7 intention 
questions (5 stage Likert 
scale) were reduced to a 
single PBC variable. 
 